The Lisbon Judgment and the External Trade Policy of the European Union

A Single Constitutional Limitation to Deeper Integration?
The Lisbon Judgment of the FCC voices an encyclopaedic extent of opposition to the Lisbon Reform Treaty. 7 If one is to consider the sheer length of the judgment and the basic arguments contained therein alone, it is clear that the court intended to give a directed judgment, one which amounted to a general overview of the process of European Integration in light of the German Basic Law. That the FCC was completely opposed to a number of policy fields under Union Law can certainly be cited as a reason behind this judgment. From the beginning, the boundaries which were drawn in the judgment should have indicated a certain permanence or durability. One should not however make the mistake of considering the submissions of the Court as being solely about the CCP. To a much greater extent the comments are connected with further areas in which 'Member States extend the scope of competences and the political possibilities of action of the European association of integration'. 8 In practical terms, what the FCC envisages by this are the fields of Judicial Co-operation in criminal and civil matters, external relations, the Common Defence and Security Policy and ultimately, social policy. The jurisdiction of the EU in these fields, according to the FCC, 'can, and must, be exercised by the institutions of the European Union in such a way that at Member State level, tasks of sufficient weight in extent as well as substance remain which are the legal and practical conditions of a living democracy'. 9 Additionally the court is of the view that as long as the so mentioned competences are expressed in such a manner, amendments or changes will not contain any element of state involvement or causality. 10 what is particularly interesting is that the FCC has furnished areas dealing with vastly different subject matter with a single constitutionally based caveat, in spite of the fact that the Union in each of these fields is assigned different competences. It is clear that the FCC was less concerned with showcasing the CCP as the outer limit of integration, rather than with exercising a complete overview of the Lisbon Treaty and of the amendments and changes which were introduced in its wake. Ultimately it must be asked whether this mixture of a variety of different subject fields can be considered to be progressive. As has been mentioned, the CCP incorporates a field of Union exclusive competence.
11 According to Art. 2 para. 1 TFEU, this entails that the Union alone may act legislatively and execute legal acts in such a field. Member States may only act in these fields in so far as they have been authorised to do so by the Union or in order to adopt Union acts into their national laws.
12 Therefore, Member States have consciously reduced their role in these policy fields to a minimal level, which could be primarily associated with the affected areas. Alongside the CCP, each of the following areas form part of the exclusive competences of the Union-subject to certain limitations-the customs union, competition policy, monetary policy and the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy. 13 Excluding the last field of action mentioned, it is clear that it is areas which are politically and economically sensitive which fall within the exclusive competences of the Union. Conversely the grounds of competence for the other fields about which the FCC speaks are completely different: in social policy and in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice the Union is only afforded a shared competence (Art. 4 para. 2 lit. b and lit. j TFEU); moreover the Common Defence Policy forms part of the intergovernmental regime of Union law.
14 Faced with this range of different competence grounds, it is surprising that the FCC formulated a singular constitutionally-based proviso or caveat. undoubtedly less of a risk that the competences of the Member States will be depleted in the domain of defence than in the area of the CCP. Looked at from a different perspective, the fields of judicial co-operation or defence (politically, at least) take centre stage more than measures in the realm of the CCP.
However, the Member States play an altogether different role than in other fields. It is obvious that because of their heterogeneity, the mixing by the FCC of different policy areas in its judgment is highly problematic. Particularly in the field of the CCP, it can be especially difficult to allow for activities by Member States, which are properly significant in both their extent and substance. 15 The demands of the FCC can nowadays no longer be adhered to. What is perhaps a sensible approach for the areas of defence-or social policy provides in the best case scenario only stopping potential for the CCP and goes beyond the actual practice of this field. In so far as the FCC perceived that the CCP needed to be confronted, different sectors should have warranted different approaches.
Common Commercial Policy and (National) Constitutional Law: Three Aspects
In practical terms the judgment deals with three aspects of the post-Lisbon CCP:
1. Firstly, analysis of the practical and legal extension of Union competences as part of the CCP into the arenas of 'foreign direct investment', 'trade in services' and 'trade related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights' is to the forefront. 2. Attached to this is a consideration of the consequences of an expansion of competences, with respect to the role of the Member States in the WTO. 3. Finally, the FCC confronts in detail the broadening of Art. 207 TFEU to incorporate 'foreign direct investment'.
The submissions emerge from the reasoning of the FCC which has been applied in general to policy arenas which have emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. In other words: within the extension of competences and the practical consequences arising there from, the FCC seeks an interpretive approach, which facilitates an interpretation of competences which adheres to the Basic Law or 'enhances national sovereignty'.
Practical-Legal Facets of the CCP
A starting point for the analysis of the FCC is to develop a concept of the newly structured Art. 207 TFEU. 16 FCC summarises the amendments which have been made and even when a strong statement of the Court's WTO opinion 17 is made, this statement is only intended to refer to the division of competences as they existed prior to the Treaty of Nice coming into force. 18 By choosing this starting point for its analysis, it is obvious that the FCC is anxious to show that the ECJ has formulated limits to Union competences and that the concept of an 'allencompassing' CCP should bear on further submissions. The FCC does however recognise that henceforth with the Lisbon Treaty in force 'the Union acquires the sole power of disposition over international trade agreements'. 19 Nevertheless the FCC regards such treaties as being capable of enormous consequences, which may result in 'an essential reorganisation of the internal order of the Member States'. 20 In its final analysis, there is a dual perspective in the remarks made by the FCC about the CCP: on the one hand, an overbearing influence of international trade law in the national constitutional sphere should be controlled and hindered, whereas on the other hand, the FCC is concerned with maintaining scope for the Member States, which is ultimately connected with the preservation of the competences held by the FCC.
The Future Role of EU Member States in the WTO
A desire to maintain an outward looking focus is also reflected in the FFC's ideas on the (future) role of the Member States in the WTO. 21 According to the FCC, as a result of the comprehensive competences afforded to the EU in the field of CCP, the Member States risk that their Membership of the WTO will be reduced to mere formal status. 22 The remarks of the FCC state that this affects in particular Member States' voting rights within the WTO, their standing in the Dispute Settlement Understanding as well as their participation in future negotiation rounds for the development of the WTO Regime. 23 Which limits have been drawn by the FCC? Initially it considers the (formal) membership of the Federal Republic of Germany as being unaffected by the Lisbon Treaty. In this sense the EU cannot under any circumstances force Member States to withdraw from the WTO. The Member States, in so far as the above statement is true, will continue to have the opportunity to take part in future WTO negotiation rounds. With respect to this, the Federal Government is obliged to inform both the German Bundestag and the German Bundesrat of any developments which happen on the WTO arena.
In any case there is a limitation already in place for the FCC, in so far as a gradual reduction of Member State legal personality in external relations matters would enable the European Union to act 'more and more clearly in analogy to a state'. 24 These remarks by the FCC refer not only to the CCP, but also to external matters in a general sense, which also includes other fields of EU external relations (in particular the CFSP). This is moreover plausible in the context of the unified orientation as regards foreign relations which accompanied the Lisbon Treaty. 25 It can be deduced therefrom that the limits which German constitutional law has created for the field of Union competences refer to the situation which will arise from the use of such competences, i.e. whereby the Union will communicate in unified manner in external matters. Clear criteria cannot be derived from this. However it is obvious that the FCC is concerned with preserving on a lasting basis the 'double membership' of the Member States and the Union within the WTO and indeed it considers this 'cooperatively mixed' membership as a model for other international organisations and collectives of states. 26 
Foreign Direct Investment Post Lisbon
There was a detailed evaluation of the new competence in the field of foreign direct investments in the FCC's Lisbon judgment. 27 The FCC finds boundaries resulting from the interpretation of the term 'foreign direct investment', and develops its own proposal for interpreting this term. The remarks of the FCC can be interpreted in a broad fashion. The court assumes that the new competences held by the EU in this domain will primarily effect 'only encompasses investment which serves to obtain a controlling interest in an enterprise [. . .]'. This observation suggests that‚ exclusive competence only exists for investment of this type whereas investment protection agreements that go beyond this would have to be concluded as mixed agreements'. 28 This proposed interpretation by the FCC has been criticised on numerous occasions. 29 In the context of its subject matter, the FCC has been criticised for leaving open the question as to why it considers such a limited interpretation to be constitutionally required. The motivation for this is however clear when the practical significance of Investment Protection Treaties and the means by which German capital is invested abroad are considered. The Federal Republic of Germany should retain a certain influence in this field; the EU should not be put in a position to appoint itself as the sole actor in this policy arena. Only a judgment of the ECJ can make a final determination on the term 'foreign direct investment', with respect to what is outlined in Art. 19 TEU.
The Future Role of Member States' Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
The judgment also posed the important question as to what the effects of the shifting of competences in relation to currently existing Bilateral Investment Agreements of Member States might be. 30 The FCC assumes in its judgment that the Union must authorise Member State BITs which are already in force; however, the practical consequences of this remain undefined. 31 The foundation of this 'duty to authorise' lies apparently in a practice of the Member States and the justification for this is shaky. Disregarding the weaknesses in its reasoning, the intention of the FCC is indeed unequivocal. If a change in the structure of competences in the area of the CCP has been observed, then the impact of this should be absorbed. The FCC manifestly seeks means to maintain Member States BITs. It is highly doubtful whether a so-constructed 'duty to authorise', which ultimately prejudices an autonomous decision by the Council of the European Union, can constitute a realistic boundary. Such a move is questionable from the perspective of the autonomy of the Union legal order, not least because neither the Commission nor the Union as a whole is bound by the jurisprudence of the FCC.
Finally the clear boundaries provided for in the judgment affect the general form of the Union: as long as it does not develop into a federal construct, the Union may continue to develop the External Trade policy. Such a move in the direction of becoming a federal state is neither envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty (quite the opposite is the case) nor is it possible in the constitutional order of the Union. 35 The potential to halt further development which has resulted from these limitations-be they of a primarily political or a primarily legal nature-should not be underestimated, as it concerns not only the CCP, but rather the entire field of EU external relations. Once more the problematic construction of the whole Lisbon judgment can be clearly seen. The concentration of the Union's fields of action as determined under national law is neither coherent nor is it possible under Union law. In the context of the CCP many of the FCC's submissions more closely resemble political statements, which are best avoided. The EU is nevertheless best advised to pay heed to this 'warning shot' and to also sufficiently consider areas of exclusive competence and the co-operation structures for European constitutional matters and administration, as are outlined in the Lisbon Treaty. The sharing of tasks and co-operation in the framework of the EU can no longer solely focus on the determination of unilateral limitations. Far more attention should be paid to the form which a commonly executed integration process would take, which would benefit the citizens of the EU.
